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International Commercial Arbitration
MARC

J.

GOLDSIN *

1. Proceedings to Set Aside Awards Rendered in the United States

Two recent federal appellate decisions reached opposite conclusions about the relevance of
the Federal Arbitration Act' (FAA) to a motion to set aside an international arbitration award
rendered in the United States. The question is whether article V of the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)2 provides

*Marc J.

Goldstein is with Proskauer Rose LLP in New York City.
1. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) [hereinafter FAA].
2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, art. V,
21 U.S.T. 2517 (hereinafter New York Convention]. Article V of the Convention states:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against
whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition
and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them,
under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties
have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment
of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of
the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated
from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted
to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the
law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made.
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law of that country; or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that
country.
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the exclusive grounds on which a court may vacate such an award, or whether, instead, an
award may be set aside by an American court based upon one or more grounds set forth in
section 10 of the FAA3 or upon one of the so-called "implied" grounds for refusing to enforce
an award that has been recognized under the FAA. The most significant "implied" ground
that American courts have recognized is "manifest disregard of the law."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, in Algbanim d&Sons v.
Toys R Us, I=,"that "manifest disregard of the law" and other "implied" grounds for setting
aside a domestic award are permissible grounds to vacate an international arbitration award'
rendered in the United States.6 In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held, in IndustrialRisk Insurers v. M.A.N Guteboffiungsbutre GmbH,7 that the grounds
for refusing recognition and enforcement of an international arbitration award stated in article
V of the New York Convention are also the exclusive grounds on which a court at the place
where the award was made may set aside the award.
The Aigbanim case in the Second Circuit involved an international arbitration award
made in New York in an arbitration between a Kuwaiti claimant and an American defendant.
The award was in favor of the claimant in an amount in excess of $46 million. The claimant
moved to confirm the award in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, and the American defendant cross-moved to vacate the award. Defendant
argued that under chapter 1 of the FAA, the award could be set aside as irrational and in
manifest disregard of the law, even though these grounds are not set forth in article V of
the New York Convention. The Second Circuit agreed, holding that article V(l)(e) of the
New York Convention recognizes the power of a court at the place of arbitration to vacate
an award pursuant to the arbitral procedural law of the forum. That power is recognized
by article V(l)(e), the Court noted, because that section authorizes any court asked to

3. FAA § 10, 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (1970). Section 10 of the FAA provides:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award
was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award
to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
4. Alghanim & Sons v. Toys R Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997), cm. denkd, 118 S. Ct. 1042 (1998).
5. An "international arbitration award" here refers to an award to which the New York Convention applies,
pursuant to articie I thereof, either because it was "made in the territory of a State other than the State where
the recognition and enforcement of such award is sought," or it is "not considered as domestic awards in the
State where their recognition and enforcement are sought." Under section 202 of the FAA, an award isconsidered
"domestic," and thus, outside the scope of the Convention, if it involves only United States citizens and has no
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states, such as property located abroad or an envisaged contractual

performance abroad.
6. Thus, an award in a case between New York and Delaware corporations, in an arbitration held in
Pennsylvania, would still be an award to which the Convention applies if the dispute involves property located
abroad, contract performance abroad, or some other reasonable relation with a foreign state.
7. Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutenhoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998).
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recognize and enforce an award to do so on the ground that the award has already been
set aside by a court at the place of arbitration.s
The Second Circuit observed:
[w]e read artide V(IXe) of the Convention to allow a court in the country under whose law the
arbitration was conducted to apply domestic arbitral law, in this case the FAA, to a motion to
set aside or vacate that arbitral award ... because the Convention allows the district court to
refuse to enforce an award that has been vacated by a competent authority in the country where
the award was rendered.
In support of its position, the Second Circuit cited the views expressed by foreign courts and
leading commentators on the Convention, that the Convention simply does not govern an
action to set aside an award, and that article V of the Convention contemplates that an award
may be set aside, in the country where the award was made, on all grounds permitted by the
procedural arbitral law of that country) °
The Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in IndustrialRisk Insurers. That case
involved an international arbitration award rendered in Tampa, Florida. The losing party moved
to vacate the award in the United Stated District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
and appealed from that court's denial of the motion. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, citing
Aigbanim for the proposition that the grounds for refusing enforcement of an award, set forth
in article V of the Convention, are exclusive. But the court failed to consider the differences
between a proceeding in which recognition of the award is sought, and one in which the only
relief requested is to vacate the award. The court went on to hold that the award could not
be vacated as "arbitrary and capricious," because this was not a ground for refusing enforcement
under article V of the Convention.
These decisions highlight a fundamental tension in application of the New York Convention
between the Convention's declared exclusivity with regard to enforcement of awards to which
the Convention applies, and the apparent decision of the drafters of the Convention to permit
free rein for the national (or other local) procedural arbitral law of the place of the arbitration with
regard to setting aside an award."' The notion that Convention awards depend for their validity,
in the first instance, on the procedural law of the situs conflicts fundamentally with the contemporary view of international arbitration as "anational," that is, that the proceedings and resulting
12
awards have only a physical connection, but not a legal one, with the situs of the arbitration.
8. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V(lXe). Article V(1Xe) provides that enforcement of an award

may be refused where "[t]he award... has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made."
9. Algbanim &Som, 126 F.3d at 21.
10. Id.
11. The Second Circuit in Aigbanim & Sons cited a number of leading commentators on the drafting of the
Convention, all of whom had come to the conclusion that the effect of artide V(IXe) is to permit an award to
be set aside at the place of arbitration on grounds permitted by domestic procedural law. The Court observed:
"There is no indication in the Convention of any intention to deprive the rendering state of its supervisory
authority over an arbitral award, induding its authority to set aside that award under domestic law." Id. at 22.
12. A leading exponent of the anational view, Jan Paulsson, has written that the "core objective" of the
New York Convention was to "free the international arbitral process from the domination of the law of the
on Cbromalloy, 12
place of arbitration." Jan Paulsson, Redisovering the New York Convention: Further Refljecti
MEAZY'S INT'L Ass. REP. 20, 24 (1997). In the same article, Mr. Paulsson expressed the "anational" view as
follows:
As we reach the end of the century, I do not believe that much wind is left in the sails of die-hard
territorialists, who cling to the abstract notion that nothing of legal significance can happen

anywhere ifit isnot either approved or tolerated by the local sovereign. Accordingly, they consider
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Advocates of the "anational" view have strongly endorsed the decision in 1996 by a United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, which granted enforcement to an international
arbitration award made in Egypt, even though that award had been set aside by an Egyptian
court before enforcement was sought in an American court. 3 Cbromalloy Aeratervices v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, however, was firmly grounded in the text of article V, which provides that
enforcement of an award may be refused on the basis, inter alia, that a local court at the place
of arbitration has set aside the award. The Cbromalloy court reasoned that where the award
had been set aside in Egypt on grounds that would not independendy permit an American
court to refuse recognition and enforcement, the court could properly exercise its discretion
to grant recognition and enforcement. While the result in the Eleventh Circuit case is consistent
with the "anational" view insofar as it makes the Convention's defenses to enforcement exclusive
in a proceeding to vacate a Convention award, that court's construction and application of
the texts of the Convention and the FAA appear to be seriously flawed. The essential shortcoming
of the Eleventh Circuit's analysis is its assumption that article V of the New York Convention
provides the applicable grounds for a motion to vacate an international arbitration award
rendered in the United States, and not merely the applicable defenses to a motion to confirm
an award.
This assumption is contrary to the text of article V of the Convention, which sets forth the
grounds on which "[rlecognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it isinvoked," upon the presentation of sufficient proofto "the competent
authority where the recognition and enforcement issought .... "In IndustrialRisk Insurers,however, there had been no application to confirm the award before the federal district court in Tampa.
Since that court was not one in which "recognition and enforcement [had been] sought," article
V should have had no role to play. Article V of the Convention does not refer to the grounds on
which a motion to vacate a Convention award may be granted. The setting aside of an award is
referred to only in article V(lXe), which provides that a court in which enforcement of the award
is sought may refuse enforcement on the grounds that the award "has been set aside or suspended
by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made." The Eleventh Circuit failed to take into account the Convention's dual regime governing
the validity of awards, consisting of courts at the place of arbitration applying national or local
procedural law in vacatur proceedings, and courts anywhere that are asked to recognize and enforce
the award, applying the Convention. As the Second Circuit had correctly observed in Algbanim,
the New York Convention simply does not identify legal standards governing a motion to vacate
an international arbitration award that ismade, as was the motion to the district court in Industrial
Risk Insurers, to the competent judicial authority at the place where the award was made. According to article V(1 Xe) of the Convention, this matter is governed by the procedural law applicait heretical for an award to be enforced abroad if it has been set aside in the country where it
was rendered. This abstract vision simply does not correspond to contemporary commercial
reality. Japanese and American businessmen may meet in an Indian airport and sign a contract
relating to a European venture and given legal effect in Europe without anyone pausing to consider
whether the contract is "heretical" because it has not complied with Indian formalities. Similarly,
an arbitrator is not an emanation of a sovereign, and when he resolves an international dispute
his award may be given effect without necessary reference to the acceptance or tolerance of the
legal system of the place where he rendered his award.

With respect to the "anational" view of international arbitration, and the implications of AIgbanim, see generally
Thomas Carbonneau, Debatingthe ProperRole of NationalLaw Under the New York ArbitrationConvention, 6 TuL.
J. INT'L & Comp. L. 277 (1998).

13. Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.C. 1996).
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ble to the arbitration, which will be the law of the situs of the arbitration unless the parties have
agreed otherwise."
One important question left unanswered in Algbanim, and answered without adequate
analysis in IndustrialRisk Insurers, isthe basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in a proceeding
brought by the losing party to vacate a Convention award. The Eleventh Circuit assumed there
is federal jurisdiction over such a proceeding based upon chapter 2 of the FAA." Chapter 2
itself is ambiguous on this point. Section 203 provides that "[an action or proceeding falling
under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States."
But since a motion to vacate the award is a proceeding governed not by the Convention, but
by the procedural arbitral law of the place of arbitration, arguably such a motion is not an
"action or proceeding falling under the Convention."
However, two other sections of chapter 2 appear to support the conclusion that chapter 2
does create federal subject matter jurisdiction over motions to vacate Convention awards. First,
the phrase "falling under the Convention" in section 203 is evidently borrowed from section
202, which provides in essence that non-domestic arbitration agreements and awards "fall[]
under the Convention." Chapter 2 contains no further definition of an "action or proceeding
falling under the Convention," but does, in section 205, provide for removal from state to
federal court "[w]here the subject matter of an action or proceeding pending in a state court
relates to an arbitration agreement or award falling under the Convention ..." Thus, a motion
to vacate a Convention award initiated in a state court is dearly subject to removal. Since it
would be nonsensical for federal jurisdiction based upon removal to exist where the matter
could not be brought in federal court originally, the sensible construction of these sections,
taken together, is that a proceeding to set aside a Convention award involves a federal question
under section 203 of the FAA, and thus may be brought in federal court in the first instance,
without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 6
As the Second Circuit held in Aigbanim, the applicable procedural standards in such a
proceeding are furnished by chapter 1, section 10 of the FAA, which applies in a Convention
case under chapter 2, section 208 of the FAA. That Section provides for a residual application
of chapter Iin Convention cases, to the extent not in conflict with the Convention. No conflict
arises
from the existence under the law of the place of arbitration of a ground for vacatur that
is not among the defenses to enforcement found in article V because the Convention specifically
envisions that eventuality in article V(lXe).
14. The Second Circuit cited leading commentators on the drafting history of the Convention in support

of its position. Aigbanim & Som, 126 F.3d at 22. Further, at the time the Convention was drafted it was already
well established, particularly inEuropean civil law countries, that the procedural law applicable to an arbitration
is the "lex loci," i.e., the law of the place of the arbitration.
15. The Eleventh Circuit correctly concluded that an award rendered inFlorida based on American substantive
law, in an arbitration between American and German parties, is a Convention award, and held that this was
sufficient basis to find federal subject matter jurisdiction based upon the Convention. Industrial Risk Insurers v.
M.A.N. Gutenhoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434 (11th Cir. 1998).
Matter of the Application of Lurgi Mettallurgie GmbH, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19148 (S.D.N.Y.
16. See,
e.g.,
Dec. 3, 1997) (stating that federal question jurisdiction exists, based on Convention and chapter 2 of the FAA,
over petition to stay arbitration, where the arbitration agreement falls under the Convention).
The opposite conclusion would create some anomalous results. Notably, in an arbitration between two nonAmerican parties, the federal courts would not have diversity jurisdiction. Further, since the dispute between
them would almost inevitably not involve interstate or foreign commerce of the United States, their arbitration
agreement and the resulting award would fall entirely outside the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act, such that
a motion to vacate an award to which the Convention dearly applies would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the state court at the place of arbitration.
SUMMER 1999
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In an era of global commerce and an emerging transnational legal community with progressively more uniform legal standards, it is troublesome to conclude that the legal standards
applicable to vacatur of Convention awards in United States courts are evolving through the
law applicable to judicial review of domestic arbitration awards. Even sophisticated parties and
experienced practitioners might wrongly assume that the Convention is exclusive in the domain
of international awards. Modification of the Convention to prescribe the exclusive grounds
for vacatur of awards, or to clarify the power of an enforcing court, a la Cbromally, to enforce
an award previously vacated by a local court at the situs may be necessary to secure a truly
anational "legal regime governing the validity of international arbitration awards."
II. Parallel Award Recognition Proceedings in Different Jurisdictions
Another Second Circuit panel was required this past year to address enforcement issues
under the New York Convention that arise from the Convention's dual regime of local and
transnational review of awards. In Europcar Itaia,S.P.A v. Maillano Tours, Inx.," the court
was called upon to review a district court's discretionary refusal, under article VI of the Convention, 18 to adjourn proceedings to enforce an award made in Italy, pending parallel proceedings
in Italian courts to confirm and to set aside the same award.
In Europear, the award had been made in an informal arbitral proceeding known in the
Italian legal system as arbitrato irrituale. Before the Tribunal of Rome, the losing American
party sought to have the award set aside based on the contention that its signature on the
arbitration agreement had been forged. In a separate proceeding in the same court, the prevailing
Italian claimant sought confirmation of the award. The claimant also moved to confirm the
award in New York, while the Italian proceedings were pending, and the respondent countered
by asking the district court to adjourn the case based upon article VI of the Convention. The
district court refused to adjourn, and proceeded to confirm the award without awaiting the
judgment of the Italian court.
The Second Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the adjournment motion. In doing so, the court identified a series of factors that the
district court should take into account in deciding whether to grant a motion to adjourn
enforcement of a Convention award, including: (1) the goal of arbitration to resolve disputes
expeditiously; (2) whether the award will receive greater scrutiny, under a less deferential
standard of review, in the courts of the country of origin; (3) whether the proceedings in the
country of origin are to enforce the award (a factor in favor of adjournment), or to set it
aside (which would militate against adjournment); (4) whether the foreign proceedings were
commenced first, which might raise international comity concerns; (5) whether the proceedings
in the country of origin were initiated to hinder or delay resolution of the dispute; (6) the
relative hardships to the parties resulting from adjournment or continuation of the enforcement
proceedings; and (7) "any other circumstances that could tend to shift balance in favor of or
against adjournment."'"
17. Europcar Italia, S.P.A. v. Maeillano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 1998).
18. New York Convention, supra
note 2, art. VI. Article VI provides:
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to a competent
authority referred to in article V(lXe), the authority before which the award is sought to be
relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award
and may also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the other
party to give suitable security.
19. Europcar, 156 F.3d at 317-18.
VOL. 33, NO. 2
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Perhaps the only consolation to be taken from this numbing array of factors is that district
courts are free to apply them, to grant or deny requests to adjourn enforcement proceedings,
subject only to very limited appellate review for "abuse of discretion." The Second Circuit
held that this is the applicable standard of review of a district court decision on a motion to
adjourn under article VI of the Convention.
But Europcar illustrates once again that the decision of the Convention's drafters to
preserve an appellate role for courts at the situs of the arbitration has serious efficiency
costs. Like Aigbanim and Industrial Risk Insurers, Europcarsuggests that reform may be
needed to redefine the role of courts at the arbitration situs in the review of Convention
awards. In Europcar, the motion to vacate the award was made on a ground, fraud in the
procurement of the arbitration agreement, that the Convention permits to be raised as a
defense to recognition and enforcement, 2" wherever enforcement might be sought. Arguably
it serves no good purpose to permit the losing party to seek vacatur of the award in the
courts of the country oforigin on a ground that could be asserted as a defense to enforcement.
The adverse effects of this aspect of the Convention's dual appellate regime include: the
opportunity for forum-shopping by the party seeking to avoid enforcement and recognition
of the award; parallel enforcement and vacatur proceedings in multiple jurisdictions with
the attendant risk of inconsistent determinations; and wasteful and time-consuming motions
to adjourn enforcement proceedings, which force judges to balance the policies of arbitration
with notions of international comity. Convention reformers might well consider whether
the opportunity for judicial vacatur at the situs, upon a ground recognized under article
V as a defense to enforcement, is a redundant level of review. The elimination of this right
would not substantially diminish the portfolio of legal rights that the parties to an international arbitration generally expect to arise from the selection of an arbitral forum. Experience
suggests that the right of appeal to local courts at the situs to set aside the award under
local law is rarely a criterion for forum selection.
Until such reform occurs, however, enforcing courts should be mindful of the Second
Circuit's admonition to take a dim view of a losing party's efforts to hinder or delay
enforcement. Motions to vacate awards, made upon grounds that may be asserted defensively
under article V in an enforcement proceeding, might well be viewed as presumptively
dilatory, and thus as rarely presenting an enforcing court with a compelling reasons to delay
enforcement proceedings.
III. Use of Section 1782 to Obtain U.S. Discovery in Aid of Foreign Arbitration
Thirty-five years after the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a federal appellate court has
held, in a case of first impression at the appellate level, that a private commercial arbitration
under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is not a "proceeding in
a foreign or international tribunal" for which discovery may be obtained by compulsion from
non-parties as provided in this statute."
20. New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V(lXa). Article V(lXa) of the Convention provides that recognition and enforcement may be denied, itr alia, where the arbitration "agreement is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the
award was made...."
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1998) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give
his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in
SUMMER 1999
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a decision awaited with great
interest in the arbitration community, held in NationalBroadcaingCo. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,"
that neither the text nor the legislative history of § 1782 supports the conclusion that Congress
intended to have federal district judges compel non-parties to international arbitrations to provide
discovery for use in those proceedings. The court's decision affirmed a district court order
which had quashed subpoenas issued to several New York investment banks in connection
with an arbitration in Mexico between NBC and a Mexican television broadcasting company.
Considering first the ordinary meaning of the statute's text, Judge Jose Cabranes writing for
unanimous Second Circuit panel, conduded that the word "tribunal" did not unambiguously
include, or exclude, international arbitration panels.23 Then, proceeding to examine the legislative
history, the court found dear evidence of a congressional purpose to extend discovery assistance
to non-conventional foreign adjudicative bodies, such as administrative tribunals, but was unable
to find any expression of congressional intent to extend assistance to tribunals that were not
either units of a foreign government or creatures of intergovernmental agreements. Finally,
the court observed that the conclusions mandated by the statutory text and legislative history
were fully supported by the policies underlying the FAA, which treats arbitration as a creature
of the contract between the parties that ordinarily should not impose obligations on non-parties
except as specified in the FAA itself.
The Second Circuit's decision appears likely to gain wide acceptance in view of its careful
scrutiny of the legislative history. 4 The Second Circuit's task was complicated by the fact that
the drafter of the bill that included § 1782 was Professor Hans Smit, at that time a director
of a project at Columbia University Law School that furnished assistance to the Commission
on International Rules of Judicial Procedure. In a recent article, Professor Smit has asserted
that § 1782 was intended by the drafter to cover private arbitrations, and should be so construed.' The Second Circuit, however, noted that the Senate Report on § 1782 relied on a
1962 article by Professor Smit, which expressed the view that an international tribunal owes
both its existence and its powers to an international agreement.2 6 As the Second Circuit's
decision notes, Professor Smit's 1962 article, and the 1964 House and Senate reports on
a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal
accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by
a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may
direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced,
before a person appointed by the court....
22. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear Steams & Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 933 (2d Cir. Jan. 26, 1999).
23. Preliminarily, the Court noted that section 7 of the FAA prescribes the circumstances under which

arbitrators may issue a subpoena, and that section 7 is narrower than section 1782 in several respects, notably
that the arbitrators may only issue a subpoena to a person residing within the judicial district where the arbitration
takes place, and that under the express language of section 7 the subpoena may only command the person to

appear or produce information for use inthe hearing (and, by implication, not for discovery). The Court noted
that, were it to find that a "tribunal" under section 1782 includes a private international commercial arbitration
tribunal, it would be necessary to decide whether section 7 of the FAA isexclusive, inwhich case section 1782
would be inconflict with the FAA. Id.at 7-9.
24. For a comprehensive review of the relevant legislative history, case law, and commentary that also reached
the conclusion that section 1782 should be construed not to apply to private international commercial arbitrations,
see Donald Rivkin & Barton Legum, Attempts to Use Section 1782 to Obtain US Dicovery inAid of Foreign
Arbitrations, 14 ARa. hwr'L 213 (1998).
25. Hans Smit, American Asistance to Litigation in Foreignand Internatiana Tribunals: Section 1782 of Titl
28 of the US.C Revisited, 25 SYR. J. rr'L L. & CoM. 1, 5 (1998).
26. Nat'l Broad. Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 933 at "18, quoting Hans Smit, Asistance Rendered by the
United States in Promeedings Before InternationalTribunals, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1264, 1267 (1962).
VOL. 33, NO. 2

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND DISPUTES

397

§ 1782, can be searched in vain for affirmative evidence of an intention to include private,
contractual, arbitral tribunals within the scope of the statute.
Numerous decisions of the United States Supreme Court over the last decade have emphasized
the contractual, consensual nature of the arbitration process, and the strong federal policy
reflected in the FAA to give effect to the agreement of the parties. The Second Circuit's decision
is in keeping with that philosophy, and reflects the widely shared perception that discovery
in private international arbitration should proceed as the parties have agreed, or as the applicable
rules may provide or the arbitrators may direct. Further, by declining to recognize an anomalous
benefit that would inure mainly to foreign parties involved in arbitrations with American
adversaries, the Second Circuit's decision may be seen as advancing the cause of a more uniform
regime of transnational rules governing the arbitration process.
IV. Other Judicial Decisions in the United States
In other noteworthy developments in United States courts during the past year:
(1)Two more federal appellate courts, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, held that the "antiwaiver" provisions of the federal securities laws do not bar enforcement of freely-negotiated
forum-selection and choice-of4aw clauses even though the consequence of enforcing such clauses
is to bar a suit in federal court under the civil liability sections of the federal securities laws.27
Given the unanimity among the federal courts of appeals that have addressed this issue in a
series of actions involving disputes between the Lloyd's insurance market and American "names"
in Lloyd's syndicates, there appears to be little remaining doubt that a freely-negotiated arbitration clause in an international commercial agreement will be enforced under the FAA, even
where the effect of such an agreement is to bar a fraud claim under the federal securities laws
because of a choice of foreign substantive law. That conclusion seems to follow afortiori from
the Lloyd's decisions enforcing forum-selection clauses that designated the English courts to
resolve disputes applying English law, together with the strong federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements, reflected in the FAA and repeatedly affirmed in decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States."8
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court stated in a footnote of its 198 5 decision
in Mitsubisbi Motor Corp. v. Sokr Cbryskr-Plymoutb, Inc.29 that it would have little hesitation
in condemning, as a violation of public policy, "choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses that
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for
antitrust violations . ..",0 Up to the present time, however, the Court has repeatedly declined

27. Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285 (1IthCir. 1998), ret. denied, 67 U.S.L.W.
3436, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 494 (Jan. II, 1999); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1995)
(en banc), ert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
28. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
Indeed, one of the two Supreme Court cases central to the analysis in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit cases,
Sdberk v. Abento.Culer Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), involved an agreement to resolve disputes by private arbitration
before the International Chamber of Commerce. The Court referred to such an arbitration clause as "a specialized
kind of forum selection clause...." Id. at 519.
29. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
30. Id at637.
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to grant certiorari in the Lloyd's cases, which have presented the analogous public policy
question in the context of statutory remedies for securities violations."
(2) The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed confirmation of a
Convention award, agreeing with the district court that the losing party had waived the right
to oppose confirmation, on the basis of alleged corruption of the arbitrators, by proceeding
with the arbitration after the facts suggesting the alleged corruption had come to light. 2
(3) A federal district judge in Michigan enforced an arbitration agreement under chapter 2
of the FAA, rejecting the contention that the parties' choice of Ontario law to govern their
contract made Ontario law applicable to the question of arbitrability."
(4) A federal district judge in New York declined to compel arbitration of a dispute between
the Andersen Worldwide organization and certain of its member firms, where the issues of
the scope of arbitrable disputes and the proper forum were already pending before an ICC
tribunal. The court held that "[t]he ICC should decide whether these issues are properly litigated
in the pending ICC arbitration, in another ICC arbitration, or in another forum under the
Swiss Intercantonal Arbitration Convention." 3 While the court did not cite the ICC's Rules
of Arbitration, its holding is consistent with the position on the relative competence of national
courts and arbitral institutions reflected in article 6(2) of the new ICC Rules (in force as from
January 1, 1998). Under article 6(2), a dispute concerning arbitrability may be decided in the
first instance by the ICC Court of Arbitration, and, if the ICC Court isprima fade satisfied
as to the existence of an arbitration agreement, "any decision as to the jurisdiction of the
Arbitral Tribunal shall be taken by the Arbitral Tribunal itself." According to article 6(2), a
party to a pending ICC case may apply to a court to determine the existence of a valid agreement
to arbitration only if the ICC Court finds no such agreement primafai and notifies the parties
that the arbitration cannot proceed.
V. Comprehensive Revision of ICC Rules of Arbitration
New ICC Rules of Arbitration (Rules) went into effect on January 1, 1998." The Rules
apply to ICC arbitrations commenced after that date. In large measure the Rules are designed
to streamline administration of cases by the ICC, as well as to reflect developments in arbitration
practice. No dramatic changes are effected by these Rules, although there are some new provisions designed to remedy gaps in coverage, such as the new article concerning appointment
of arbitrators for multi-party arbitrations.
The most obvious change in the Rules is structural: the Rules are now organized into seven
subdivisions that track the normal chronological course of an ICC case: Introductory Provisions,
Commencing the Arbitration, The Arbitral Tribunal, The Arbitral Proceedings, Awards, Costs,

31. See, e.g., Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F. 3d 1285 (1 th Cir. 1998); Richards v. Lloyd's
of London, I35 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998); Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v.
Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953

(10th Cir. 1992).
32. AAOT Foreign Econ. Ass'n Technostroyport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 139 F.3d 980 (2d Cir.
1998).
33. Westbrook Int'l, LLC v. Westbrook Tech., Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13325 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25,

1998).
34. Andersen Consulting Bus. Unit Member Firms v. Andersen Worldwide Sociiti Coop., 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3252 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1998).
35. Sa generalyW. CRAiG E"rAL., ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE 1998 ICC ARBREATION RuLEs wrrH COMMENTARY (1998).
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Miscellaneous. In addition, certain rules formerly found in the internal rules of the ICC Court

can now be found in the body of the Rules, enabling users to better understand the role of
the court in case administration.
A number of the Rule changes were intended to reduce delays and clarify provisions concerning the payment of advances on costs. The substantive content required in the Request for
Arbitration and the Answer has been reduced to permit cases to be launched more quickly
(articles 4 and 5). The Secretary General is empowered to confirm the nominations of arbitrators,
eliminating delays that formerly occurred when only the court could confirm such nominations
(article 9). The arbitration may move forward under the new Rules even though one party
may be in default in payment of the advance on costs, but the Secretary General may order
the tribunal to suspend work if the full advance is not paid, thus creating an incentive for the
non-defaulting party to pay the full advance (article 30(4)). The parties are now authorized to
reach agreement to shorten the deadlines provided for in the Rules, to permit the case to be
conducted and resolved on an abbreviated timetable (article 32(1)).
New article 10 of the Rules concerning the appointment of arbitrators in multi-party cases
follows the lead of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Rules, and the ICC's
own practice, in providing for the court to appoint the arbitrators where multiple claimants
or multiple defendants fail to nominate a single arbitrator jointly and the parties are unable
to agree on another method for the appointment of the tribunal. The ICC had adopted this
practice in response to the French Cour de Cassation decision in the Dutco case, in which an
ICC award was set aside on grounds of public policy because the requirement that multiple
defendants nominate a single arbitrator while a sole claimant also nominated a single arbitrator
violated the principle of equality of the parties. The solution of having the court appoint all
three arbitrators ensures equality of the parties, but at the expense of the important right of
a party to have a party-appointed arbitrator.36 The Rules leave open the possibility that a

tribunal having more than three members might be appointed incertain circumstances, although
this would be a departure from ICC practice.
Article 23 of the Rules clarifies the power of an arbitral tribunal to grant interim and
conservatory measures, and the circumstances in which such measures may be obtained from
a court during the pendency of an ICC case. While the power of an arbitral tribunal to grant
interim measures of protection has long been recognized in ICC practice, it was not recognized
explicitly in former article 8(5). Article 23 also recognizes the power of an arbitral tribunal to
make an award on interim measures, a power that for many years has been recognized in
the UNCITRAL and American Arbitration Association Rules, among others. This raises the
possibility that at least some awards on interim measures may be recognized and enforced, in
some jurisdictions, under the New York Convention. Article 23 also amends former article
8(5) to provide that resort may be had to a court, to obtain interim measures, in "appropriate"
circumstances after the tribunal has been constituted, but those circumstances no longer need

to be "exceptional" as article 8(5) formerly required.
The ICC declined to adopt aspecific set of procedures for expedited or "fast-track" arbitration,
and the leading commentators report that "[a]ccording to past practice, the Secretariat will
cooperate with the parties to work out an appropriate fast-track procedure when the parties

36. SeeMarc J. Goldstein, Constituting the Arbitral Tribunal for the Multi-Party Case: Possible Solutions
OFTHE CHAETERED
CONFERENCE
for Institutional Rules, in Tit Com-tciM. WAY rojustcE, 1996 INTERNAT5oNAL
INsTrrur OFAarrEAToas 101 (Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell ed., 1997).
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wish to do so." 37 This does not, however, dearly cover the situation where one party claims
urgency and seeks a departure from the time periods provided in the Rules, while the other
party perceives'no such need. Neither the Rules nor the ICC's practice reflect any sentiment
in favor of "fast-track" arbitration without the consent of all of the parties.
VI. Other Institutional Developments
A.

SWEDEN

At the time of this writing the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(Arbitration Institute) was about to adopt new Arbitration Rules, and Sweden's Parliament
was expected shortly to approve a new Arbitration Act. Both the Act and the Rules were
scheduled to come into force on April 1, 1999. In recent years Sweden has played host to an
increasing number of international arbitrations in which both or all parties are non-Swedish,
and most international arbitrations in Sweden take place under the auspices of the Arbitration
Institute. The most significant new rule, article 24 concerning the applicable law, clarifies that
in the absence of agreement of the parties on the applicable law "the Arbitral Tribunal shall
apply the law which it considers to be most appropriate," without having to refer to conflict
of law rules. This approach is in conformity with recent trends in arbitral practice and institutional
rules, including the American Arbitration Association International Arbitration Rules and the
new ICC Rules.
B. UNITED STATES

In 1998, the American Arbitration Association's International Center for Dispute Resolution
(Center), founded in mid-1996, experienced a continued increase in the number of new cases
filed with the Center. Approximately 380 cases were filed in 1998, representing an eleven
percent increase in case filings from 1997. Among non-American parties involved in those new
cases, nearly twenty-five percent were from European countries, thirteen percent were from
Asia, Australia and New Zealand, eleven percent from Latin America and the Caribbean, and
ten percent from Canada. The AAA adopted amended International Arbitration Rules as of
April 1, 1997, updating rules that had been patterned after the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
Significantly, those rules provide that where parties have provided for arbitration of an international dispute by the AAA without designating particular rules, the International Arbitration
Rules will apply. This eliminates a source of confusion for parties involved in an international
dispute who are more familiar with the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules applicable to
domestic cases. Among the other important changes in the AAA International Rules are:
(1) clarification of the arbitrators' power to select the applicable law, absent agreement of the
parties, without reference to conflict of law rules (article 28(a)); (2) a waiver of the right to
claim punitive damages unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise (article 28(5)); (3) a
new rule expressly recognizing the confidentiality of the proceedings, the award, and proscribing
disclosure of confidential information disclosed during the proceedings (article 34); (4) modification of the rule on an interim measure to expressly recognize the power of an arbitral tribunal
to grant injunctive relief (article 21(1)); and (5) a provision on arbitrator appointments in
multi-party cases, that the administrator shall appoint all the arbitrators unless the parties have
agreed otherwise (article 6(5)).

37. ANNOTATED
VOL. 33, NO. 2

GUIDE,

supra note 35, at 14.
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KINGDOM

The London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) also adopted revised arbitration rules
which took effect January 1, 1998 for arbitrations commencing after that date. The rules have
been restructured and streamlined to facilitate use, including a new artide 4 on Notices and
Periods of Time, and separate articles dealing with formation of the Arbitral Tribunal (article
5), Nationality of Arbitrators (article 6), and Party Nominations (artide 7) containing rules
formerly found in the lengthy article 3 of the 1985 version of the LCIA Rules. A new article
8 concerning arbitrator appointments where three or more parties are present follows the trend
of divesting the parties of the right to nominate arbitrators unless all the parties are aligned
into two separate sides each of which will nominate one arbitrator. New article 9 goes significantly
further than other revisions of institutional rules to facilitate "fast-track" arbitration, permitting
the LCIA Court in its discretion, and upon application by a party, to curtail time limits under
the Rules in order to expedite formation of the Arbitral Tribunal. Former article 7 concerning
the place of arbitration is replaced by a new article 16 entitled "Seat of Arbitration and Place
of Hearings," and is designed to reflect in the rules the understanding in contemporary practice
of the legal significance of the seat of the arbitration, notably that unless the parties agree
otherwise, the procedural arbitration law applicable to the proceedings will be the law of the
seat of the arbitration, and that the arbitration will be considered to be conducted at the seat
of the arbitration even if the Arbitral Tribunal conducts proceedings or deliberations elsewhere.
Article 23 concerning the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal sets forth a new subsection
declaring that the parties, by agreeing to arbitrate under these Rules, shall be treated as having
agreed that they will not apply to a judicial authority to determine the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, except with consent of all parties, permission of the Tribunal, or after an award on
the jurisdiction issue.
VII. Supplementary Rules of Evidence Proposed by International Bar Association
During the past two years, the Arbitration and ADR Committee (Committee D) of the
International Bar Association (IBA) has prepared revisions to the IBA Rules of Evidence for
International Arbitration Proceedings, originally adopted in 1983. The Draft [BA Supplementary Rules Governing the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration are designed to fill
the void intentionally left in many institutional and ad boc rules, as to applicable procedures
governing the collection and presentation of evidence, before and during evidentiary hearings.
The Rules present a method for conducting an arbitration, and are meant to represent a blending
of common law and civil law procedures. As noted in the Rules, they are intended for adoption
by the parties, either in the arbitration agreement or when a dispute arises, or to serve as
guidelines for the arbitrators in the exercise of the procedural discretion reposed in them by
institutional and ad boc rules. The [BA hopes to conclude the drafting of the Rules in early
1999, with a goal to have them adopted by the IBA Council at its meeting in Boston in June
1999.
The Rules contain many practices and principles familiar to arbitrators and practitioners,
reflecting widely accepted, but otherwise uncodified, procedural norms. Article 3 governing
document production recognizes the right of the arbitrators to order production of documents
relevant to the outcome, on their own initiative, as well as the right of a party to submit a
document request to the tribunal, which may order the adverse party to comply. The broad
scope of document discovery recognized in American civil practice is not recognized; instead
a party's Request to Produce must contain a specific description of the documents or category
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of documents requested, the matters to be proved by means of the documents requested, and
a statement as to why the documents are assumed to be in possession of the adverse party.
The Rules establish a procedure for submitting objections and for the tribunal to rule on such
objections, including the possibility of inspection of a contested document by an independent
and impartial expert. Article 10 of the Rules adopts the well-established principle that the
tribunal may draw adverse inferences from the non-production of a document ordered to be
produced.
Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules govern, respectively, testimony of fact witnesses, partyappointed experts, and tribunal-appointed experts, and operate in conjunction with article 8,
which prescribes evidentiary hearing procedures. A party must submit a written Witness Statement in advance of the hearing for each witness who may be called to testify; similarly partyappointed experts must furnish written Expert Reports. The written testimony may be admitted
and considered even if the witnesses do not testify at the hearing, but the tribunal or the adverse
party may request that the witness appear to testify in person. The Rules provide that the
tribunal, absent exceptional circumstances, shall ignore the testimony of a witness whose Witness
Statement or Expert Report is submitted but who is not made available to testify at the hearing
if requested to do so. Article 6 concerning tribunal-appointed experts reflects such familiar
practices as the expert's terms of reference, expert's statement of independence and challenge
procedure, the expert's co-equal power with the arbitrators to require the parties to produce
evidence, and the right of the parties to comment in writing on the expert's report and to
question the expert at the evidentiary hearing.
The Rules can serve several useful functions, even if they are not widely adopted in baec
verba in arbitration clauses or submission agreements. They are a valuable guide in counseling
clients who may wish to, and be able to, select between national courts and international
arbitration in transaction documents. The rules can be read quickly, and the principal differences
from American civil practice can be readily discerned, by a non-litigating transactional lawyer.
Clients and counsel who find themselves involved in international arbitration for the first time
can read the Rules as a fair approximation of the procedures likely to be imposed, as a matter
of discretion, by experienced arbitrators. And both Arbitral Tribunals and disputants will find
the rules to be a useful guide to resolving potentially contentious, and time-consuming, procedural
issues. Finally, to the extent Arbitral Tribunals adopt the rules in whole or in part, challenges
to the validity of awards on grounds of unfair procedures will be reduced, as courts that are
asked to vacate or refuse enforcement of awards may consult the Rules as a reliable guide to
international norms of procedural fairness.
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